This paper shows that the semantics of shenme 'what' exhibits a double quantification phenomenon in Chinese bare conditionals. I show that such double quantification can be nicely accounted for if one adopts Carlosn's semantics of bare plurals and verb meanings as well as the assumption that shenme 'what' may denote kinds of things as bare plurals do.
Introduction
In this paper, I am going to examine the differences between shei 'who' an shenme 'what' in what Cheng and Huang (1996) refer to as "bare conditionals". In such constructions, the conditional and consequent clauses each contain a wh-phrase of the same form and the choice of value for the second wh-phrase varies with the choice of value for the first wh-phrase. This construction is illustrated in (1).
(1) Shei xian lai, shei xian chi who first come who first eat If x comes first, x eats first./Whoever comes first eats first.'
I will show that the semantics of shenme 'what' and shei 'who' in such constructions differ with respect to how they refer. When the two wh-phrases in pair in bare conditionals involve sheì who', they must refer to the same person as in (1); but when the wh-phrases in pair involve shenme 'what, they may refer to the same object as in (2) or they may refer to a different object but of the same kind as in (3) . (2) does not need comments; (3) is worth some more remarks. Imagine a situation where a person breaks a bowl and is asked to compensate for it. In this case, if (3a) is to be true, the person who broke the bowl has to buy a new bowl which is different from the original one for compensation. The meaning of shenme 'what' in (3a) can be compared with the meaning of it in (4).
(4) If you break a bowl, then you have to buy it for compensation.
Unlike (3a), for (4) to be true, what you have to buy for compensation is the original bowl, which is broken. The contrast between (3a) and (4) is similar to the contrast between (5) and (4) , that is, between it and one.
(5) If you break a glass, then you have to buy (another) one for compensation.
Similar remarks apply to (3b). (3b) can be true in a situation where someone buys a new computer and his younger brother wants to have a computer too. In this situation, the two computers need not be the same one though they could be of the same brand. It thus seems that the shenmeanaphora seen in (3) is more like one-anaphora than it-anaphora.
In fact, a large number of bare conditionals involving shenme 'what' are ambiguous between the object-identity reading and the non-object-identity reading. One such example is (6). In (9a), the bare plural dogs seems to have the force of the quantifier most or almost all in that exceptions are admitted. As for (9b), it is appropriate to say that existential force is involved.
Finally, none of the above interpretations is appropriate for the bare plural dogs in (9c). Here it seems to refer to a kind of animals. Despite the variety of interpretations seen in bare plurals, Carlson (1977a Carlson ( , 1977b argues that they are uniformly kind-denoting terms and that the various interpretations do not result from the ambiguity of the bare plurals themselves but can be attributed predictably to some aspect of the predicate/context which they occur with/in. According to Carlson, there are three subdomains of ontological entities in the world: stages, which are "time-space slices of individuals", objects, which are the most familiar things like Jimmy Carter or this chair , and kinds, which are individuals themselves such as the species dogs or horses.
Since the predicate widespread in (9c) applies exclusively to kinds and the bare plural dogs is a kind-denoting term, (9c) translates as (10) . (10) stands for the kind of animals that are dogs.) On the other hand, the predicate intelligent in (9a) basically applies to objects but can be elevated by the "gnomic" operator Gn to a kind-level predicate, therefore giving the bare plural generic attribution. The translation of (9b) is (11). Thus, when the predicate available is applied to dogs, whose translation is XPvP(d), we get the semantic interpretation (13).
When a stage-level predicate is generalized, it can also give a generic attribution to its subject, giving a generic reading. I omit the details here. This way, Carlson successfully accounts for why bare plurals may have a variety of interpretations, though they are uniformly analyzed as kinddenoting terms.
A Semantic Analysis of Bare-conditional Donkey Sentences
As mentioned, proper names and definite descriptions denote the type of entity of what Carlson calls objects. Since the denotation of shei 'who' ranges over the same kind of individuals as proper names and definite descriptions, on the assumption that shei 'who' is a proform of proper names and definite descriptions, it must introduce object-level variables in bare conditionals. On the other hand, the denotation of shenme 'what' ranges over the same kind of entities as proper names, definite descriptions and bare nouns. So, on the assumption that shenme 'what' is a proform of proper names, definite descriptions and bare nouns, it should be able to introduce kind-level variables--if Chinese bare NPs denote kinds of things as I will argue later, in addition to object-level variables. I show below that this distinction is the key to unmasking the puzzle why bare-conditional donkey sentences involving shei 'who' are never ambiguous but those involving shenme 'what' can be ambiguous.
To begin with, some assumptions are in order. Following Cheng and Huang (1996) and Lin (1996) , I assume that wh-phrases in Chinese "bare conditionals" introduce restricted free variables that must be bound by some operator around the construction. Also, I assume with Kratzer (1978) , Heim (1982) and Kadmon (1987) that if a conditional does not contain an overt operator for the conditional clause to restrict, it can be understood as involving a null necessity operator or a covert adverb of quantification roughly equivalent to generally or always. These null operators can bind the variables introduced by the wh-phrases (Cheng and Huang (1996) and Lin (1996) ). Now consider (3) again, repeated below.
(3) shei xian lai, shei xian chi who first come who first eat If x comes first, x eats first.'
Since the wh-phrase shei 'who' only introduces an object-level variable, the tripartite structure of (3) is (14) , where the universal quantifier represents the implicit adverb of quantification of the bare conditional. In (14), since the object-level variable x° in the restriction and the one in the nuclear scope are semantically bound by the same implicit universal operator, the value for the two variables is always the same. This explains why the two shei's 'who' in (3) must refer to the same individual.
Next, let us consider the case of shenme 'what'. As discussed previously, (8) contrasts with (3) in that the two wh-phrases do not refer to the same object, though they involve a higher level identity. (8) as follows.
(15) For any kind of thing x, if there exists some object y of kind x that you break, then there must exist some object z of kind x such that you go to buy z for compensation.
If this paraphrase of (8) (12) .) The non-object-identity reading of (8) is therefore explained, because each stage variable is bound by an independent existential quantifier introduced by the verb meaning. Moreover, since stages of a kind may be different, the stage of some kind of things that you break and the stage that you buy for compensation need not be the same. Apart from the stage-level variables bound by the existential quantifier, the logical form of (16) also contains kind-level variables. These variables are those introduced by the two shenme 's what' and are bound by the implicit universal operator of the conditional. It is the binding of the kind-level variables by the implicit universal operator that is responsible for the intuition that the two shenme's in (8) involve a higher level identity though they do not denote the same objectlevel individual. We thus account for why the wh-phrase shenme 'what' in (8) seems to involve double quantification and why shenme-anaphora in this case is more like one-anaphora than itanaphora.
The above approach also accounts for why (13) is ambiguous.
(6) Ni xiang chi shenme, mama jiu zhu shenme gei ni chi you want eat what mother then cook what to you eat a. 'If you like to eat x, then mother will cook x for you to eat.' b. 'If you like to eat something of kind x, then mother will cook something of that kind for you to eat.'
The ambiguity of (6) arises simply because the wh-phrase shenme 'what' can introduce an objectlevel variable as well as a kind-level variable. If an object-level variable is introduced by the two wh-phrases in (6), they will semantically refer to the same individual; on the other hand, if kindlevel variables are introduced, the two wh-phrases only refer to the same kinds of things, but not the same objects.
Wilkinson's (1991) Semantics of Bare Plurals
As discussed above, Carlson has uniformly analyzed bare plurals as kind-denoting terms and treated existential readings as a result of verbs applying to stages. However, this analysis has been attacked by Wilkinson (1991) , who tries to eliminate stages from Carlson's ontology of things. In this section, based on the result in section 4, I will show that Carlson's existential quantification over stages is independently needed, at least, in Chinese bare-conditional donkey sentences. I will first briefly outline Wilkinson's (1991) analysis of bare plurals and then show that her approach fails to account for existential interpretation seen in bare-conditional donkey sentences.
Opposing Carlson's stand, Wilkinson (1991) has argued that bare plurals are ambiguous between names of kinds and variable interpretations. According to her view, bare plurals are kind-denoting terms when they are subjects of predicates which apply exclusively to kinds such as common, widespread or extinct, but can be analyzed along the lines of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) when they are subjects of stage-level or individual-level predicates. Thus, unlike Carlson's analysis which would translate (17) and (18) as (19) and (20), respectively, she would translate the same sentences as something like (21) and (22). (17) Diesing (1990 Diesing ( ,1992 ). On the basis of this analysis, Wilkinson argues that existential quantification over stages is not necessary. She also argues that Carlson's habitual sentences have an alternative explanation along the lines of Stump (1985) and hence the use of stages can be eliminated in those cases. Since habitual sentences are not the concern of this paper, I will not go into the detail. On the other hand, Wilkinson attributes the generic reading of (18) As discussed in the last subsection, the semantics of (8) what' under her analysis should be able to denote kind-level as well as object-level variables. Moreover, the distribution of these two kinds of variables should be determined by the predicates which take the variables as arguments. Namely, kind-level variables must be chosen when they are subjects or objects of predicates which apply exclusively to kinds. Elsewhere, object-level variables must be the denotation of the wh-phrases. These assumptions, however, would lead (8) to a nonexistent reading. In (8), since the verb dapo 'break' and mai 'buy' are not among those predicates which apply exclusively to kinds, the two shenme's 'what' must introduce object-level variables rather than kind-level variables. It follows that the object that you break and the object that you buy must be the same one, because both variables are bound by the same universal operator. However, k . In (23), the kind-level variable x is bound by the universal quantifier, thus explaining universal quantification over kinds of things. However, the logical form in (23) is inadequate. As noted, one can only break or buy some objects/stages that realize a kind of things but cannot break or buy the kind itself; namely, the wh-phrases in (8) must also be understood as being existentially quantified. But this part of existential meaning is missing in (23). In order to have existential quantification over objects, an object-level variable must appear. Yet no such variable seems available under Wilkinson's approach, because presumably one wh-phrase only introduces one variable at one time. There is no doubt that extra justification is needed if one wants to claim that a single wh-phrase such as shenme 'what' can denote something like 'object x of kind y', i.e., introducing two different variables at one time. Since I know of no evidence that a single indefinite can introduce two different variables at one time, I take (8) to be evidence that Carlson's explanation of existential interpretation of bare plurals in terms of stages and verb meanings is at least supported by Chinese data. However, Heim (1987) has found that (27) is completely acceptable.
Heim's Analysis of
(27) What is there in Austin?
As is well-known, definite NPs are not allowed to appear after there in there-insertion construction. The above examples thus suggest that which is strong, just like that, whereas what seems to be weak. In order to explain why what is acceptable in a there-insertion construction such as (27), Heim first discusses (28).
(28) How many women do you blame?
She argues that to properly interpret (28), it must be semantically analyzed or reconstructed as something equivalent to ?you blame x-many women, where x is quantified in by how. Namely, the semantic analysis of how many N-questions involve reconstructing the wh-phrase back to its premovement position except for the interrogative operator. (8) , the two shenme's need not refer to the same object, though they involve a higher level identity with respect to kinds. They need not be coreferential with respect to object-level things, because each shenme 'what' has its own existential quantifier. But the kind-level variables must be bound by the same implicit universal operator, or vacuous quantification will result (Cheng and Huang (1996) ). However, in some cases, Heim's analysis of what seems to fail to assign a bare conditional a proper truth conditions.
Consider (29).
(29) (Kan) shenme bijiao you jinian jiazhi erqie women ye mai-de-qi de, see what more have memorial value and we also buy-can-afford women j iu song shenme we then give what If x has more memorial value and we can afford x, then we will give him/her/them x.'
Observe that the antecedent clause in (29) involves a coordinate conjunction with a shared-whconstituent. Namely, the wh-phrase shenme 'what' in the conditional clause is simultaneously the subject of the verb phrase bijiao you jinian jiazhi 'have more value' and the object of the second verb mai-de-qi 'can afford'. What is significant about this fact is that the verb phrase in the first coordinate and the verb in the second coordinate seem to select a different interpretation for the shared wh-phrase. Notice that the interpretation of (29) can be said to be equivalent to the following: If watches have more memorial value and we can afford to buy one, then we willgive a watch; If necklaces have more memorial value and we can afford to buy one, then we will give a necklace; and so on and so forth. In this interpretation, there is no particular watch or necklace that has more value. It is the kind of things called watches or necklaces as a whole that has more value. In other words, the verb phrase bijiao you jinian jiazhi in (29) selects a kind-level subject. In contrast, the verb mai-de-qi 'can afford to buy', does not seem to select a kind-level object, because people only buy (some) objects of a kind of thing, rather than buying the kind itself. ((29) also has another reading in which the wh-phrase refers to an object-level entity. This reading is not relevant to my discussion here.) 
